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MINIMUM CONTACTS AS APPLIED TO
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-
WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V. WOODSON
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment restricts the use of
long-arm statutes 1 by states to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.2 The original due process standard prohibited personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant was physically present
within the state's boundaries. 3 In the landmark decision of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 the United States Supreme Court retracted this
territorial presence test, substituting a test based on minimum contacts. In
enunciating the new standard, the Court held that in personam 5 jurisdiction
should be asserted only when a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state to satisfy traditional due process notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 6
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the due process limits of
personal jurisdiction have been few, and although these cases provide sig-
nificant guidelines for claims based upon various legal theories, they did not
apply, until recently, the minimum contacts test to a products liability ac-
tion.7 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,8 the Court inter-
preted the International Shoe standard to deny a party from maintaining a
1. Since 1945, almost all states have provided that doing business, transacting business,
making a contract with a forum state resident, or committing a tortious act inside or outside the
state gives state courts jurisdiction over nonresident defendants performing such acts. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(f) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 117 (1963); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302(a) (McKinney 1972); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a federal district court may use the long-arm statute of the state in which it
sits to acquire jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
2. For general discussions of due process as it affects long-arm statutes see Cleary, The
Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PuB. L. 293 (1960); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight
Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Nordenberg, State Courts,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 587 (1979); Note,
The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65
VA. L. REV. 175 (1979); Note, Jurisdiction Over Alien Manufacturers in Products Liability
Actions, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1585 (1972).
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See note 24 infra.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Before a court may render a valid judgment, it must have both subject matter juris-
diction and jurisdiction over the parties. Jurisdiction over the parties involved in the dispute is
in personam jurisdiction. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDuRE 4-5 (2d ed. 1979).
6. The International Shoe Court, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940),
stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of a forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play, and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316.
7. See cases cited in note 36 infra.
8. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
1159
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cause of action against a seller and distributor in Oklahoma when injury
resulted from an allegedly defective product sold in New York. 9 The Court
held that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant could not be
sustained absent "contacts, ties or relations" with the forum state. 10 The
minimum contacts test, as defined in World-Wide Volkswagen, now limits
personal jurisdiction in products liability actions to those cases in which the
seller has purposefully sought a market for its product in the forum state.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze World-Wide Volkswagen's applica-
tion of existing law as well as its formulation of new jurisdictional principles.
Further, this Note criticizes the Court's focus on discarded principles of
jurisdiction. The result of the decision is also questioned as it favors defen-
dants over plaintiffs by applying too faithfully the minimum contacts and
purposeful availment tests. Finally, World-Wide Volkswagen's impact on fu-
ture products liability cases is evaluated and alternatives are suggested.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN
In September 1977, plaintiff Kay Robinson was driving from New York to
Arizona when her Audi automobile was struck in the rear by another au-
tomobile in Oklahoma.11 Mrs. Robinson and her children were severely
injured when the rupture of the car's gasoline tank caused a fire in the
passenger compartment. As a result of the collision, the Robinsons 12 in-
itiated a products liability suit in Oklahoma against the New York sellers of
the automobile to recover for personal injuries sustained in the accident. 13
The plaintiffs claimed that their injuries resulted from the defective design
and placement of their Audi's gas tank and fuel system. Plaintiffs had pur-
chased the Audi from defendant Seaway Volkswagen in New York in 1976.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation, as Seaway's regional distributor, was
joined with Seaway as defendant in the action.14
9. Id.
10. Id. at 299.
11. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353 (Okla. 1978). The driver
of the other car was not made a party to the Robinsons' suit.
12. Mrs. Kay Robinson brought suit on her own behalf, and two Robinson children sued
through Mr. Robinson as their father and next friend. 444 U.S. at 288 n.2.
13. It has been held that a products liability action can be maintained both against manufac-
turers and against retailers. Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 53 (Okla.
1976). Jurisdiction is then obtained over a foreign manufacturer or retailer by either the consent
of the corporation or the fact that it is doing business within the state or both. Currie, The
Growth of the Long Ann: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
533, 535.
14. Throughout this Note, references to World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation also include
Seaway Volkswagen. Volkswagen and Audi, manufacturers of the automobile, were also named
defendants in this action; however, they did not appeal the jurisdictional decision. Rather, they
remained as defendants in the litigation before the District Court of Oklahoma. 444 U.S. at 288
n.3.
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Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen entered special appearances in the
Oklahoma district court, 1 5 maintaining that the state's exercise of jurisdiction
over them would exceed the due process limitations imposed upon the
state's jurisdictional authority. After the district court rejected this consti-
tutional claim, 16 Seaway and World-Wide sought a writ of prohibition 17 in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to restrain the respondent trial judge1 8 from
exercising personal jurisdiction over them. The defendants asserted that they
lacked any contacts whatsoever with Oklahoma' 9 and, therefore, that the
assumption of jurisdiction over them by the State of Oklahoma would violate
their due process rights. 20 In denying the writ, the state supreme court
cited the Oklahoma Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act 2 ' as
authority for its exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the out-of-state
defendants. The court reasoned that the inherent mobility of cars made their
use in other states foreseeable, thus satisfying the minimal contacts require-
ment of the statute. 22
15. Although Volkswagen also entered a special appearance, it did not appeal the issue of
jurisdiction to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.
16. The district court's rulings are unreported, but they appear at appendices 13 and 20 in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17. A writ of prohibition is issued by a superior court, directed to the judge and parties of a
suit in an inferior court, requiring them to cease action because of a lack of jurisdiction.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1091 (5th ed. 1979).
18. The respondent in this case was the Hon. Charles S. Woodson, Oklahoma trial court
judge. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 352 (Okla. 1978).
19. World-Wide is incorporated in New York, as is Seaway. They both maintain their busi-
ness offices in New York. World-Wide does business with Volkswagen retailers in New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut. Neither entity "does any business in Oklahoma, ships or sells any
products to or in that state, has an agent to receive process there, or purchases advertisements
in any media calculated to reach Oklahoma." 444 U.S. at 288-89.
20. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
21. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.01-1706.04 (West 1980) (commonly referred to as the
Oklahoma Long-Arm Statute). The state supreme court specifically referred to § 1701.03, which
provides in part:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's:
(3) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if
he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this state; . . .
Id. § 1701.03(a) (emphasis added).
22. 585 P.2d at 353-54. Applying § 1701.03(a)(3), the court held that no act or omission on
the part of World-Wide took place in Oklahoma. Nevertheless, under the provision of subsec-
tion (a)(4), the court held that, based upon the nature of a car and upon the fact that goods sold
and distributed by the petitioners were used in Oklahoma, it was "reasonable to infer, given the
retail value of the automobile that the petitioners derive substantial income from automobiles
which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma." Id. 'at 354 (emphasis added).
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. 23  The issue facing
the World-Wide Volkswagen Court was whether personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident seller of an allegedly defective product could be based upon one
isolated incident. Writing for the Court, Justice White found that the State
of Oklahoma could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation, because World-Wide
lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the state. The Court placed
great emphasis upon the fact that but for the Robinsons' act of driving
through Oklahoma, World-Wide would have had no contacts with the forum
state.
PRIOR CASE LAW AND THE COURT'S REASONING
Since the introduction of the International Shoe test of minimum con-
tacts, 24 several Supreme Court cases have sought to clarify its application 2 5
23. 444 U.S. at 299. The majority opinion was written by Justice White, who was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens. Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun dissented.
24. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), brought about the first basic
change in the jurisdictional theory of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). It eliminated Pen-
noyer's physical presence requirement, and held that due process does not require that a de-
fendant be present in the state but only that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with
the state. 326 U.S. at 316.
In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court first faced the question of under what circumstances a state
court could constitutionally exercise judicial power over a non-consenting, nonresident defen-
dant. Its decision was two-fold. The state court could directly exercise judicial power over such
a defendant through an in personarn proceeding only if that defendant was served with process
while present in that state; it could indirectly exercise judicial power through an in rein pro-
ceeding if that defendant owned property in that state. 95 U.S. at 732-36. In introducing
minimum contacts, the International Shoe Court had hoped to provide a theoretical justification
for subjecting foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of courts in states where they operated. In
the seventy years since Pennoyer, the economy had so greatly expanded that corporations were
no longer mere creatures of the state in which they were headquartered, but were carrying on
activities in many states. See note 40 infra.
In International Shoe, suit was initiated against a Delaware corporation in Washington state
court for unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. From 1937 to
1940, the corporation had salespersons in Washington who were authorized only to exhibit
samples and solicit orders. The orders were filled by mail directly from the home office. The
corporation maintained no office in the state. justice Stone, writing for the Court, found due
process to require only that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the state so that
the "maintenance of the suit [would] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' " 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Further, the
Court required that such a due process analysis be based, not upon the quantity, but upon the
"quality and nature of the activity" of the defendants within the state. Id. at 319. Applying
these standards, the Court deemed the Delaware corporation amenable to suit in Washington.
Due to the defendant's interstate business, suit in Washington would not have been un-
reasonable; because of the corporation's contacts in Washington, notice of suit in that state
would be actual; and taking into account the estimated inconveniences to the parties, suit in
Washington would not impose too great a burden on the Delaware-based corporation. Id. at
317-21.
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In his dissent, Justice Black capsulized the majority's minimum contacts criteria into one
word, "reasonableness." Id. at 323-26 (Black, J., dissenting). Such an elastic standard, he felt,
would not suffice to provide a reliable measuring rod needed to invalidate laws as contrary to
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Black feared that future courts would use the words "fair
play," "justice," and "reasonableness" as yardsticks to strike down laws, without realizing that
they were intended only to describe the concept of natural justice integral to the Constitution.
Id. at 325-26. Nonetheless, the minimum contacts standard has survived. See cases discussed in
note 25 infra.
25. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Supreme Court
heralded further jurisdictional expansion in holding that a single act within the state would be
sufficient contact if it gave rise to the cause of action in that case. Suit was maintained in
California by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by a Texas corporation to plaintiff's
son, a California resident. The only contact defendant had with the forum was the mailing of
one insurance policy to the resident plaintiff. McGee offered a more liberal approach than In-
ternational Shoe in determining jurisdiction over a nonresident. The Court held that it was
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer because: (1) the forum state had
an interest in providing effective means of redress for its citizens when their insurers refused to
pay claims; (2) the insurer could foresee that its acts in Texas would have an affect in the forum
state; and (3) the forum's situs was not so inconvenient that the defendant insurer would be
unduly burdened. Id. at 222-24. The Court concluded by discussing the trend toward expanding
the states' jurisdictional powers with the increasing ease of modern travel. Id. at 222-23.
In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), decided during the same term as McGee, the
Supreme Court arrived at a quite dissimilar result. In Hanson, the settlor, domiciled in
Pennsylvania, executed an inter vivos trust naming a Delaware trust company as trustee. The
settlor then moved to Florida and there executed his will. Beneficiaries under the will brought
suit in Florida to declare the trust invalid. The Court held, however, that Florida had no
jurisdiction over the trustee, since there had been no voluntary act between the trustee and
Florida. The trustee had no office in Florida, transacted no business there, and did not solicit
either in person or by mail in the state; therefore, the requisite minimal contacts were absent.
Id. at 251-52. Thus, in its interpretation of International Shoe, Hanson imposed another
stumbling block for state courts in obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident. It held that there
must "be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id.
at 253.
In announcing purposeful availment by a defendant as a requirement of in personam juris-
diction, the Court curtailed the jurisdictional expansion initiated by both International Shoe and
McGee. After Hanson, a court must look for a voluntary act on the part of a defendant to the
exclusion of consideration of general reasonableness. Indeed, the rule laid down in International
Shoe was much broader than the Hanson interpretation. See Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis
for Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 671, 682-85 (1965). Justice
Black, who dissented in International Shoe, also dissented in Hanson but for different reasons.
He stated the standards that should have been used in Hanson were those central to a dis-
cussion of reasonableness. 357 U.S. at 260-62 (Black, J., dissenting). He asserted that the Court
instead based its denial of jurisdiction on the outmoded principles of Pennoyer. Id.
Twenty years later, the Court again commented on the proper application of the minimum
contacts test. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the plaintiff, a nonresident of Dela-
ware, owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, a business incorporated in
Delaware with its principle place of business in Arizona. He filed action in Delaware alleging
mismanagement on the part of Greyhound, its officers and directors. The Delaware trial court
asserted jurisdiction based on the statutory presence of property owned by over twenty-one of
the individual defendants, all nonresidents, by sequestering their property in the state. Dela-
ware courts could compel the appearance of a nonresident defendant by seizing his or her
property, and if the defendant failed to appear, his or her property could be sold to satisfy the
plaintiff's demands. The property sequestered consisted of 82,000 shares of Greyhound stock.
Although none of the stock certificates were located in Delaware, they were considered to be in
the state by virtue of a Delaware statute that makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1159
but have not significantly done so. Initially, under International Shoe's
minimum contacts test, due process was satisfied through an analysis of the
"quality and nature" of the defendant's activity within the forum state. 26 The
due process requirement was met if the defendant's contacts with the state
made it reasonable to require defense of the particular suit in that state.2 7
Later, Shaffer v. Heitner28 held that paramount to an analysis of whether
in Delaware corporations. The defendants' motion to quash service of process, which was de-
nied, contended that the sequestration did not afford them due process and that they did not
have sufficient contact with Delaware under the minimum contact rule of International Shoe.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. It held that personal
jurisdiction over the nonresidents should not have been assumed because a state's territorial
power over property is, by itself, an insufficient basis for assuming jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 213.
The Court then reaffirmed the Hanson requirement that the defendant must purposefully avail
himself of the benefits of the forum state's laws and concluded that the defendants' acts were
insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 216.
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978), is the Supreme Court's latest attempt to
delineate the proper application of minimum contacts. Kulko and his ex-wife had negotiated a
separation agreement in New York, providing that their children would spend the school year in
New York with appellant and that the appellant would pay child support during the children's
vacations in California with their mother. In 1972, after signing the agreement, Mrs. Kulko flew
to Haiti to obtain a divorce decree. The next year the younger child decided to spend the
school year with her mother and vacations with her father. The appellant consented and this
arrangement continued without added support payments. In 1976, the older child, desiring the
same arrangement, also moved to California, whereupon Kulko's former wife brought suit in
California to declare the Haitian divorce a valid California judgment, to award her custody and
to increase the support payments. The California Supreme Court held that Kulko was subject to
California's jurisdiction because by allowing his children to move to California he caused
a foreseeable effect in the forum, and derived an economic benefit from California law. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the acquiescence of a divorced father, who is a
New York resident, to a daughter's desire to live with her mother did not constitute purpose-
ful availment of California's laws and therefore did not confer jurisdiction over the divorced
father in California courts. Id. at 94. The Court pointed to basic considerations of fairness in
determining New York to be the proper forum. Id. at 97-98.
26. 326 U.S. at 319. The Court specifically denounced a mechanical test. In the past, the
Court noted, a single act of a corporation had not been thought to be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, while other acts-"because of the quality and nature and the circumstances of their
commission"-would be sufficient to bring a corporation within a state's jurisdiction. Id. at 318.
The Court also stated that a single or isolated act would not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant in a suit "unconnected" with the activity in that state. Id. at 317.
This statement implies that if a single act is connected with the cause of action generated, then
a suit based on that one isolated incident in the forum state could establish valid jurisdiction
under International Shoe.
27. Id. at 317. In order to determine whether suit away from home was reasonable, the
Court stated that an estimate of the inconveniences that would result to the corporation would
be relevant. Id.
28. 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). The Court stated that the central concern in an inquiry into
personal jurisdiction is an analysis of the relationship among the parties. The majority specifi-
cally stated that nothing in its opinion is to be taken to the contrary. Id. at 204 n.20. Moreover,
the Shaffer Court recognized that the Hanson Court's statement about restrictions on state
court jurisdiction being "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States," simply reiterated that the states are defined by their geographical boundaries. Id. See
generally Note, State Court Jurisdiction Founded on Territorial Power Denies Due Process to
Non-Resident Defendants- Shaffer v. Heitner, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 447 (1977).
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minimum contacts are present was a balancing of the relationship among the
defendant, the forum and the litigation. Nonetheless, in spite of the signifi-
cant interests of the state and the plaintiff, Kuklo v. Superior Court of
California 29 held that there must exist a sufficient nexus between the de-
fendant and the forum state to make it reasonable and fair to compel the
defendant to conduct his or her defense in that state. Hanson v. Denckla 30
further specified that a unilateral act 3 l of the plaintiff could not fulfill the
requirement of contact between the nonresident defendant and the forum
state. 32 Rather, defendants alone must "purposefully avail" 33 themselves of
the privilege of conducting activities within a state before that state could
exercise jurisdiction over them. 34  Further, application of purposeful avail-
ment will necessarily vary according to the quality and nature of the defen-
dant's activity. 35
Until World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court had not addressed the question
of what would constitute minimum contacts in a products liability suit. In-
deed, former cases had defined minimum contacts only as related to a
state's jurisdiction over corporations or individuals who had become involved
29. 436 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1978). Kulko further stated that any standard based upon reason-
ableness, like the International Shoe test of minimum contacts, is not susceptible of mechanical
application. The facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the requisite "af-
filiating circumstances" are present. Id. at 92. The Court neglected, however, to define what
circumstances constituted sufficient affiliation, instead citing Hanson which had also failed to
enunciate the criteria for affiliating circumstances. See note 41 infra. See generally Note, The
Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L.
REv. 175 (1979).
30. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. The term "unilateral activity" was coined by the Hanson Court, and while not defined,
initiated an additional standard of contact to be met by a foreign defendant before jurisdiction
could be maintained. It appears that the Court meant some act neither engaged in nor con-
templated by any party other than the acting party. Many cases after Hanson implemented the
unilateral act test, including World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 298.
32. 357 U.S. at 253.
33. Id. The Hanson Court also coined the term "purposeful availment." The idea, however,
originated in International Shoe, where the Court stated that due process does not allow a state
to make a judgment against an individual "with which the state has no contacts, ties, or rela-
tions. But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within
a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state." 326 U.S. at 319 (citations
omitted). The Court went on to say that if a corporation does so benefit from that privilege,
obligations to respond to suit within that state could hardly be held unreasonable. Id. at 320.
The International Shoe Court did not specify that the defendant's act must be purposeful, stat-
ing rather that the nature of the act must render suit in that forum reasonable. Id.
34. 357 U.S. at 253.
35. Id. The Hanson Court did not specify how the adoption of purposeful availment would
vary; rather, it inserted the somewhat nebulous factors of "quality and nature" of the defen-
dant's activities to assuage the harshness of the new standard, similar to the manner in which
the International Shoe Court utilized those same terms. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. at 318-19.
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in a contract or property dispute. 36  These decisions, however, offered little
guidance with respect to state court jurisdiction over tortfeasors. 37
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court reduced the dispute to a single
issue: whether minimum contacts could be found and jurisdiction could be
based upon one isolated occurrence, an automobile collision. 38 After analyz-
ing the facts, the Court found that World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation had
carried on no business activity whatsoever in the State of Oklahoma 39 and
that the only contact World-Wide had had with the forum state was its con-
nection with the Robinsons' automobile accident. Applying the standard of
minimum contacts,40 the Court found none of the "affiliating circumstances"
36. The Supreme Court cases dealing with various topics in the context of nonresident
jurisdiction are: Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (child support); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (shareholder's derivative suit); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (corpus of a trust); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (action by
beneficiary of a life insurance policy); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952) (suit did not originate in forum state, yet jurisdiction was maintained because the corpo-
rate president was served in that state); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)
(controversy surrounding state permit laws in regard to insurance policies); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (suit regarding unpaid contributions to state
unemployment compensation fund).
37. Of the many lower court cases reaching varying results in this area of the law, the
Supreme Court singled out four decisions that conflict with the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
World-Wide Volkswagen holding. 444 U.S. at 291 n.9. Those four cases are: Granite States
Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972) (New Hampshire au-
tomobile seller and manufacturer were not subject to the jurisdiction of a Colorado court where
injury occurred in Colorado as a result of an allegedly defective automobile sold to plaintiff in
New Hampshire); Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128
(1968) (Colorado truck dealer was not subject to the jurisdiction of Kansas where truck wheel
broke off causing injury to the Kansas resident); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah
1974) (California automobile dealer was not subject to the jurisdiction of a Utah court when
injury resulted in Utah because of alleged dealer negligence); Oliver v. American Motors Corp.,
70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (Oregon automobile dealer and manufacturer were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington for injuries incurred by parties who were
overcome by carbon monoxide gas while riding in the auto in Washington).
38. 444 U.S. at 295.
39. Id. World-Wide did not sell products in Oklahoma, advertise in the local media, nor
appoint an agent for service of process. Oral arguments revealed no evidence that any car sold
by the respondents had ever entered Oklahoma except for the petitioner's. ld. at 289.
40. Id. at 295. At the beginning of its opinion, the Court traced the impact of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause on diversity actions. According to World-Wide Volkswagen and
prior Supreme Court cases, due process requires that the defendant fulfill certain minimum
contacts with the forum state for assertion of jurisdiction not to violate established conceptions
of "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 292. The minimum contacts test, claimed the Court,
has two functions. First, the finding of requisite contacts protects the defendant against the
burdens of litigating in a remote or inconvenient forum. The Court substantiated this purpose
through reference to International Shoe and its progeny, culminating in the relaxed standard
enunciated in McGee. See note 25 supra. McGee yielded to the tenor of the times in holding
that contemporary modes of transportation and communication had made it much simpler for a
defendant to defend himself or herself in a foreign state where he or she is involved in
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necessary to a finding of jurisdiction. 4 1
Respondents argued that due to the inherent mobility of the automobile,
petitioners could have foreseen the possibility of contact with the State of
Oklahoma.4 2 The Court responded, however, that foreseeability has never
been a sufficient standard for personal jurisdiction under the due process
clause. 43  It reinforced this position through a review of recent cases, 44
economic activity. 355 U.S. at 223. Therefore, it would appear, based on today's multifaceted
network of transportation, that a nonresident party could be forced to litigate anywhere in the
country without offending International Shoe's standard of reasonableness.
The second function of minimum contacts, according to the World-Wide Volkswagen Court,
implicates the notion of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. 444 U.S. at 293.
Minimum contacts acts to preclude state courts from reaching beyond their territorial limits. Id.
Under this rationale, the Court emphasized that state lines are not irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes. Id. In the final balancing of these two underlying tenets of minimum contacts, the
Court reasoned that however minimal the burden of defending in a foreign court, the due
process clause may divest a state of its power to render a valid judgment based upon considera-
tions of interstate federalism. Id. at 294. The Court cited Hanson for this proposition. It stated
that even though the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have become
more flexible, it would be a mistake to assume that this trend has precipitated the demise of all
restrictions. Rather, the Court stated that "[those restrictions are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limita-
tions on the power of the respective States." Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251).
41. 444 U.S. at 295. The phrase "affiliating circumstances," used in several of the leading
cases including Kulko, originated in Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246. The Hanson Court never defined
affiliating circumstances, and yet the World-Wide Volkswagen Court found an absence of such
in the facts of the case. Hanson quoted the phrase from E. SUNDERLAND, THE PROBLEM OF
JURISDICTION, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1270, 1272 (1955) (originally pub-
lished at 4 TEX. L. REV. 429 (1926)).
In setting forth the historical bases for jurisdiction over the person and thing, Professor Sun-
derland recounted the criteria that England employed in much the same situation. Ownership
of property alone was not sufficient, however, ownership and attachment by the courts would
invoke jurisdiction. Aside from in rem jurisdiction, "there are other possible affiliating cir-
cunstances, better calculated to connect the defendant with the local courts." 4 TEX. L. REV.
429, 441 (1926) (emphasis added). Sunderland then described England's practice under Order
XI, *Rule 1, which provides for service out of jurisdiction whenever the action is based upon a
breach of contract which was (1) made within the jurisdiction; (2) made by an agent in the
jurisdiction; (3) by its terms governed by English law; or (4) broken within the jurisdiction.
Clearly, this English view is analogous to the scheme established by our International Shoe
doctrine and long-arm statutes. Therefore, it is not unexpected that Professor Sunderland, writ-
ing this article almost 20 years prior to International Shoe, prophesized that two tests will
suffice for every jurisdictional case: convenience and fairness. Id. at 439-49. Indeed, according
to Sunderland, those affiliating circumstances, if applicable at all to a tort case, are to be mea-
sured according to the English theory of due process: fairness and reasonableness. Id. at 442.
42. 444 U.S. at 295.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 296. The Court cited Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d
502 (4th Cir. 1956) (a local California tire retailer did not have to defend in Pennsylvania
where the blowout occurred), Reilley v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J.
1974) (a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack had to defend in a distant court for
damages caused in New Jersey), and Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Serv., Inc., 304 F. Supp.
165 (D. Minn. 1969) (Florida concessionaire did not have to defend in Alaska where the injury
occurred).
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hypothesizing that if foreseeability was the criterion, every manufacturer or
distributor who puts a product into the stream of commerce would in effect
appoint the product itself as agent for service of process. 45 Further, the
Court analogized respondent's reasoning to the outmoded rule of Harris v.
Balk:46 that a debt clung to a debtor and followed wherever the debtor
went. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court, anxious not to comport with Har-
ris, held that even though an automobile is mobile in nature, it is no differ-
ent than other chattels. For purposes of due process, the Court concluded,
the mere presence of a product in a state does not constitute presence of the
seller in that state.
Justice White's majority opinion relied exclusively on the concept of pur-
poseful availment in rejecting the respondent's foreseeability argument. 47
The Court examined whether or not World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation
reasonably should have anticipated litigation in an Oklahoma court. If the
petitioner had purposefully availed itself of the laws of Oklahoma through
direct or indirect marketing of its product in Oklahoma, then it would not be
unreasonable to subject the petitioner to a products liability suit in Ok-
lahoma. The Court, however, found such facts absent in World-Wide Volks-
wagen.48  The record disclosed no marketing attempt at all on the part of
the petitioner.
The Court conceded that it was foreseeable that the patrons of World-
Wide Volkswagen would drive their automobiles to Oklahoma. 49 Neverthe-
less, in the absence of any purposeful act by the defendant which would
have led to a degree of foreseeability of out-of-state litigation, the Court
declared that the mere act of the respondents' drive into Oklahoma did not
constitute contact with the state sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. Therefore,
World-Wide Volkswagen, in applying the test of minimum contacts to a pro-
ducts liability suit, has precluded states from extending jurisdiction over
nonresident sellers in products liability actions unless that seller has person-
ally sought a market for its product in that state.
CRITICISM
In applying the minimum contacts test to the facts of World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court accurately, albeit selectively, followed prior case law.
In adopting a restrictive view of minimum contacts, the Court digressed to
the old standard of Pennoyer v. Neff, 50 basing its jurisdictional exercise upon
the actual presence of the defendant in the state, rather than upon the fic-
tional presence doctrine of International Shoe. 5' The World-Wide Volkswa-
45. 444 U.S. at 296.
46. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Supreme Court overruled this case in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
47. 444 U.S. at 297. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
48. 444 U.S. at 298.
49. Id.
50. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See note 24 supra.
51. Pennoyer based jurisdiction upon the principles of consent and presence. Although these
terms have evolved through case law, they remain the underlying policy for determining juris-
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gen Court undertook a quantitative analysis in finding no contacts between
the nonresident defendant and forum state, and thereby avoided con-
sideration of the totality of contact as measured by the quality and nature of
those connections. Additionally, the Court's emphasis on purposeful avail-
ment to establish notice to the defendant was misplaced in light of the
mobile nature of the product involved. Finally, the majority avoided dis-
cussion of the interests which both the forum state and plaintiff have in
adjudicating this matter in Oklahoma.
The Court, relying exclusively on the quantum of contact between the
State of Oklahoma and World-Wide, misapplied the International Shoe stan-
dard of minimum contacts. Emphasizing that the only nexus between the
two was one automobile accident, the Court found that the defendant lacked
sufficient minimum contacts to justify personal jurisdiction within the
parameters of due process. 52 The majority's analysis neglected, however, to
consider the quality and nature of the incident. International Shoe's
minimum contacts test is not based upon the defendant's commission of a
certain number of acts, but rather upon the nature of the defendant's act. 53
Shaffer v. Heitner 54 reiterated and reaffirmed this theory, stating that
quantitative evaluations could not resolve the question of reasonableness in a
due process analysis of jurisdiction. Most recently, Kulko v. Superior Court
of California 55 also conceded that the essential inquiry in a determination of
minimum contacts was whether the quality and nature of the defendant's
acts made it reasonable and fair to require him or her to defend in that
state. Nonetheless, the World-Wide Court failed to take into account the
grave nature of the sale of an allegedly defective automobile, thereby thwart-
ing the true inquiry in a due process analysis.
An example of such an examination can be found in the Illinois Supreme
Court decision of Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp.,5 8 which
explained the necessity of evaluating the factors of quality and nature in a
products liability action. Gray held that an Ohio manufacturer of a water
heater installed in Pennsylvania, which in the course of commerce was sold
to an Illinois consumer, was subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois. The Illinois
court stated that they did not think that "doing a given volume of business
[was] the only way in which a nonresident [could] form the required connec-
tion with [Illinois]." 57 Rather, a substantial connection is established if the
product is sold in contemplation of use in other states. 58 Although both
Gray and World-Wide Volkswagen relied upon International Shoe, Gray re-
diction. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), by requiring that the defendant "purposefully
avail itself" (consent) of the "privilege of conducting activities within the forum state" (pre-
sence), has ultimately acknowledged that Pennoyer is still with us. See Note, Hutson v. Fehr
Bros., Inc.: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 33 ARK. L. REv. 553, 555 (1979).
52. 444 U.S. at 295-98.
53. See note 24 supra.
54. 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
55. 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
56. 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
57. Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
58. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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jected quantity as the earmark of minimum contacts and instead considered
the nature of the incident involved.
In addition, the bulk of the World-Wide Court's decision rests upon its
application of the test of purposeful availment to the facts of the case. The
Court's interpretation of purposeful availment is correct;"9 nonetheless, it
was misplaced in a discussion of jurisdiction over a seller of an allegedly
defective auto. Hanson v. Denckla 60 held that the application of the
minimum contacts rule will vary according to the quality and nature of the
defendant's activity, but that it is essential that the defendant perform some
act by which he or she purposefully avails himself or herself of the privilege
of conducting business within the forum state. 6 1  Subsequent to Hanson,
both Shaffer and Kulko implemented the new test in denying jurisdiction
when the defendants in both cases were found not to have had reasonable
notice of possible litigation in the forum states. 62 A similar application of
the purposeful act test to a products liability action, however, seems inappo-
site where the relation between the seller or manufacturer and the product
becomes attenuated as a result of the product's progression through the
stream of commerce. "In view of the fortuitous route by which products
enter any particular state," 63 the purposeful availment concept cannot be
applied properly in a products liability case. 64  As the Arizona Supreme
Court noted in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,65 the purposeful
activity language of Hanson, construed literally, would revitalize the implied
consent theory overruled by International Shoe, 66 and undercut the utility of
the minimum contacts test established therein. Phillips held that jurisdiction
could be extended over an Ohio corporation for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff from a defective baking dish. 67 The Arizona court stated that the
59. 444 U.S. at 297-98. One interpretation of Hanson's purposeful act test is that it should
be confined to its facts and not be applied to all cases involving jurisdiction. "A strict application
of Hanson, a trust case, to product liability situations would limit the test of reasonableness
where breadth is most needed." Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in Products
Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 671, 685 (1965). Another commentator noted that the
Hanson decision becomes less meaningful when dealing with a products liability situation be-
cause, as a corporation loses control over its product through the circuitous route of commerce,
fairness under International Shoe must be considered under a broader interpretation than that
of Hanson. Note, Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc.: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 33 ARK. L. REV.
553, 562-63 (1979).
60. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
61. Id. at 253.
62. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (merely because the appellants bought
stock in a corporation that was formed in Delaware, "it [would] strain reason ... to suggest that
[they] 'impliedly consent[ed]' to [Delaware jurisdiction] . . . on any cause of action"); Kulko v.
Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (appellant's mere acquiescence to his daughter's
wish to live in California does not constitute notice of suit in that state).
63. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966).
64. Id.
65. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
66. Id. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
67. Id. at 259-61, 413 P.2d at 737-39.
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degree of fi)reseeability by the seller of the locale of its product's consump-
tion is one measure of fairness contemplated by International Shoe upon
which jurisdiction should be based rather than upon the purposeful activity
language of Hanson. Other fairness factors, according to Phillips, are the
nature and size of the defendant's business, and the economic independence
of the plaintiff.6 8
Foreseeability, and not purposeful availment, has also been found to be a
necessary component in determining jurisdiction in automobile products lia-
bility actions. 69  These courts have reasoned that it is not unreasonable to
assume that a car seller or manufacturer should have anticipated that the car
sold would come to be used in other states.7 0  Therefore, in light of the
normal usage of the product, a car dealer or manufacturer should be pre-
pared to defend wherever the defect surfaces. Nevertheless, instead of rec-
ognizing the importance of considering the nature of the product involved,
thereby giving significance to the issue of foreseeability, the World-Wide
Court deemed purposeful availment the deciding factor. 71 Under this
analysis, the indirect flow of a product through the stream of commerce does
not constitute sufficient control by the defendant to warrant personal juris-
diction. 72 In essence, the Court decided that only a direct sale of au-
tomobiles to a state's consumers or a sale through an agency relationship
would constitute "purposeful availment" by the defendant. Thus, the Court
apparently found that World-Wide Volkswagen sold a product which became
the subject of a suit in Oklahoma as a result of mere happenstance. 73
The Court should have found, based on the intended use of an au-
tomobile, that it was foreseeable that a defect in manufacture could have
surfaced anywhere in contiguous states. Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted
68. Id. at 260, 413 P.2d at 738.
69. Several cases since Hanson have adopted this theory and rejected the purposeful avail-
ment test in a products liability action. The exercise of jurisdiction has been upheld in Reilly v.
Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974) (Wisconsin automobile dealer held
liable in New Jersey for injuries resulting from a faulty jack which the dealer had sold to the
plaintiff in Wisconsin); Roche v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1967)
(New York corporation installed a refrigerator body in a truck owned by a company doing busi-
ness in New York; the truck subsequently traveled to New Jersey and was the subject of an
accident in which the refrigerator body's design was a contributing factor).
Where it is reasonably foreseeable that a product will enter the flow of commerce, the man-
ufacturer or distributor of that product should expect to be sued in any state where the product
is alleged to have caused injury. See Note, Jurisdiction: Construction of "Tortious Act" In New
York's Long Arm Statute, 66 COLUMs. L. REV. 199, 207 (1966).
70. Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.N.J. 1974); Roche v.
Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 564, 232 A.2d 162, 167 (1967).
71. 444 U.S. at 298-99.
72. The indirect flow of commerce theory has been rejected by several lower courts since
the Hanson decision. See note 37 supra.
73. 444 U.S. at 298-99. Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.N.J.
1974), emphasized that "[a]utomobiles are items that by their nature, and by the driving habits
of Americans, commonly traverse long distances." Id. In light of this view, Reilly held that a
dealer should be prepared to defend anywhere in the nation. Id.
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his confusion with the majority's assertion that if a product was purchased in
the chain of distribution, a state could exercise jurisdiction over all members
of that chain, but if a product entered a state through its intended use, such
jurisdiction would not be allowed. 74 Justice Blackmun also voiced concern,
in his dissenting opinion, over the majority's lack of concern for the "nature
of the instrumentality under consideration." 75 In spite of contrary logic and
reasoning, the Court submitted World-Wide Volkswagen to the purposeful
act test of Hanson.76  Therefore, until further products liability litigation is
presented to the Court, the standard of purposeful availment, not foreseea-
bility, will determine jurisdiction.
A third flaw in the World-Wide Volkswagen Court's reasoning resulted in
an incomplete analysis of minimum contacts; one that did not balance the
interests of all of the parties involved-the defendant, plaintiff and forum
state. A basic tenet of minimum contacts is embodied in the consistent
consideration afforded the relations between the parties. 77 Neverthe-
less, this concept eluded any type of analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen. 78
International Shoe recognized that the importance of defendant contact
would diminish if increased significance were afforded other considera-
tions, 79 such as the interests of the state and parties to litigate in a particu-
lar forum, and the actual burden to the defendant of defending the suit in
that forum.80 Indeed, the World-Wide Volkswagen majority directly ad-
dressed these issues as they related to a pure due process analysis in the
first half of its opinion.8 ' Nevertheless, the Court omitted application of
these factors to the facts of the case.82 Had the World-Wide Court balanced
the competing interests, it would have recognized that the State of Ok-
lahoma has a paramount interest in protecting its citizens on its highways,
74. 444 U.S. at 315-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan questioned the majority's
distinction between chain of distribution and intended use as ways a product arrives in a state.
"In each case the seller purposefully injects the goods into the stream of commerce and those
goods predictably are used in the forum State." Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 297-98.
77. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. at 92 (the Court stated that the interests of
the forum State and the plaintiff are to be considered in an analysis of minimum contacts).
Justice Brennan criticized the Court for its excessive focus on the defendant and his relation to
the forum, and its consequent disregard of the interests of the state and plaintiff. 444 U.S. at
300-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 444 U.S. at 295-99. The majority specified that implicit in an analysis of reasonableness,
which underlies minimum contacts, is a consideration of other relevant factors. Such factors,
according to the Court, include the forum state's interest in adjudicating the matter and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining a convenient forum. Id. at 292. The World-Wide Court, how-
ever, neglected to apply these factors to the case at bar.
79. 326 U.S. at 316-21.
80. Id. See Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. at 97-98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
at 211 n.37; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 220, 223.
81. See note 40 supra.
82. 444 U.S. at 295-99.
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just as the Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 8 3 determined that
the State of California has a similar interest in providing effective means of
redress for its residents. Similarly, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. 4 held that the state's interest in determining the interests of
claimants in trust law is rooted in custom so as to establish it beyond a
doubt. Additionally, Kulko, Shaffer and Travelers Health Ass'n v. Common-
wealth of Virginia85 all espoused the identical view. 86  Although these Su-
preme Court cases also weighed the interest of the plaintiff in seeking a con-
venient forum,8 7 World-Wide Volkswagen disregarded the plaintiff's interest,
and instead opted to allow the defendant forum convenience. Yet, World-
Wide Corporation, as a large multi-national corporation, was in a much bet-
ter financial position to move its litigation than were the injured plaintiffs.
Pursuing litigation in a distant forum involves the cost of moving witnesses
and evidence, and quite possibly could prevent a consumer from bringing
suit.8 8 Nevertheless, World-Wide Volkswagen failed to incorporate into its
reasoning the balancing of interests that heretofore exemplified the concept
of reasonableness, a concept fundamental to an analysis of minimum con-
tacts.
IMPACT AND ALTERNATIVES
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court has resolved the lower court conflict over
application of International Shoe's minimum contacts jurisdictional pre-
requisites to products liability cases. As a result of its decision, a nonresident
83. 355 U.S. 220, 203 (1957). The McGee Court held that California had a manifest interest
in providing its citizens a court in which to bring suit against foreign insurers refusing to pay
claims. California, recognizing this interest, had enacted a statute subjecting foreign corpora-
tions to suit in California on insurance contracts with California residents. Id. at 224. Evidenc-
ing a similar concern for the protection of resident motorists from having to litigate accident
claims in some distant jurisdiction, most states, including Oklahoma, have enacted non-resident
motor vehicle statutes subjecting non-resident motorists to suit in local courts. Hess v. Paw-
loski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Such statutes have been upheld. Id. at 356. The Hess Court held
that a state may, in .the public interest, make and enforce regulations that promote care on the
part of all who use that state's highways. Id. at 356. Therefore, Oklahoma and all other states
have an interest in protecting residents and nonresidents on their highways.
84. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
85. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
86. Id. at 648; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08; Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436
U.S. at 100.
87. Id. at 648; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204; Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436
U.S. at 91.
88. World-Wide Corporation was in a much better position to bear the cost of litigation than
were the plaintiffs. Beyond this, the defendants were also insured for loss anywhere in the
country. They were fully prepared for multi-state litigation. Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at
17, World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In addition to the ex-
pense factor, the respondents argued that other elements should have swayed jurisdiction to
Oklahoma: (1) The accident occurred in Oklahoma; (2) the injuries were sustained in Oklahoma;
(3) the law of Oklahoma should apply; (4) the witnesses to the accident were in Oklahoma; (5)
the hospital records and the treating physician were in Oklahoma; and (6) the plaintiffs, at the
time of the filing of the suit, were confined in a hospital in Oklahoma. Id. at 21-22.
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automobile seller that does not purposefully do business in the forum state
will remain judgment proof in that state. Further, by making it more dif-
ficult to secure in personam jurisdiction over a retailer, the Supreme Court
has increased the likelihood that consumers will not utilize the courts as a
means of redress. 89 Consequently, the defendant retailer will avoid much
litigation while the consumer absorbs monetary loss and suffers physical dis-
tress. It also is clear from the Court's opinion that other products liability
actions will be governed by the World-Wide Volkswagen rule. 90 Con-
sequently, such an aftermath, while narrowing the states' jurisdictional
powers, will only serve to benefit potentially culpable defendants.
Alternatively, the Court could have remedied these weaknesses in one of
two ways. First, the Court could have adopted an expanded jurisdictional
approach emphasizing the interests of the state and relative convenience of
the parties. 91 Instead of basing jurisdiction on defendant-forum contact
alone, the World-Wide Court could have given greater import to the in-
terests of the state and plaintiff. Such a balancing of interests would serve to
encourage both legitimate consumer litigation as inconveniences to the plain-
tiffs would be lessened, and state control in product regulation as the state
would have an effective means of redress available to its citizenry.
A second alternative available to the Court would have been to categorize
automobiles as a unique type of chattel because their mobile nature preempts
use of the purposeful availment test. 92 In requiring a purposeful act on the
part of the defendant, the Court is merely assuring notice to the defendant
of possible out-of-state litigation. Recognizing the mobile nature of a car,
however, an automobile dealer already has actual notice. In the instant case,
the chattel involved was such that its removal to another state was not a
remote possibility, but a substantial likelihood. The intended use of an au-
tomobile, unlike that of most personal chattels, gives rise to foreseeability on
the part of the seller of the product's possible use in other states or adjacent
countries. 93 An automobile dealer may not know that the buyer has re-
solved to take the car into a foreign state; nevertheless, the mere transfer of
a vehicle contemplates its use on highways inside and outside of the state of
purchase.
Adoption of a special jurisdictional category based either upon the mobile
nature of the chattel or upon the degree of foreseeable multi-state use on
the part of the seller could exempt the courts from attempting to apply the
rule of purposeful availment. 94 Adopting a special category for automobiles
89. If plaintiff had not chosen Oklahoma's state court as his forum, he would have been left
with the option of bringing suit in New York state court or in federal district court, if the matter
in controversy exceeded the value of $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
90. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
91. See notes 77-88 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 59-76 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 73 supra.
94. One commentator has suggested that the element of fairness of due process would be
satisfied absent the Hanson test by eliminating strict application of the purposeful act test, and
substituting either amenability to suit if (1) the product causes injury in that state; (2) the
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would not necessarily alter the jurisdictional rules as to other products, 95 but
would provide a proper forum for the wronged automobile purchaser. It
would seem prudent then, to classify automobiles separately according to
their mobile nature, instead of grouping all chattels into one aggregate. Ap-
parently, the majority feared even the smallest of jurisdictional extensions in
its adherence to the Hanson test.
The expanded jurisdictional approach offers a greater latitude to the Court
in future litigation than does the automobile categorization approach.
Nonetheless, both would serve to ameliorate the apparent injustices about to
be served by World-Wide Volkswagen upon consumer-plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
standard of minimum contacts in a products liability suit involving a seller
and distributor. The Court-applying International Shoe and its hybrid,
Hanson-determined that a state could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident seller of a product based upon the unilateral act of the
purchaser. 96 Rather, the sellers must purposefully avail themselves of a
state's privileges by conducting activities within that state before the state
may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over an action for a tort occurring in
that state.9 7  If it had affirmed the lower court's holding that Oklahoma
could entertain jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile dealer, the Su-
preme Court would have protected the interests of the states and rights of
consumers. Instead, by attempting to arrive at a compromise between Inter-
national Shoe and Hanson, the Court created an inequitable standard favor-
ing defendant-sellers to be used in forthcoming products liability actions.
Maureen A. McGuire
defendant has consented to jurisdiction of that state; or (3) the defendant has purposefully estab-
lished direct connections with the forum state. Cummins, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-
resident Manufacturers in Products Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1028, 1031-32 (1964-
65).
95. Non-mobile chattels would still fit under the present International Shoe doctrine; how-
ever, items associated with an automobile, such as tires, auto parts, trailers and the like, would
be classified according to use. The degree of foreseeability would also be a factor in determining
the proper forum.
The court in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966),
attempted to set forth guidelines for determining the proper jurisdiction for suit in products
liability actions. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). The
court said that fair play and substantial justice are satisfied if: (1) the cause of action involves
local contacts which make it reasonably desirable from plaintiff's point of view that the case be
tried at the designated forum; (2) the defendant has sufficient causal responsibility for the pres-
ence of the local contacts in the forum state to permit the conclusion that he has by his own
volition subjected himself to answering for them there, and; (3) relevant public policy interests
are served, or not disserved, by allowing the cause to be determined at that forum. Id. at 255,
413 P.2d at 734-35.
96. 444 U.S. at 298.
97. Id. at 298-99.
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